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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 14-2811 
____________ 
 
IN RE: JOHN SUTCLIFFE, 
     Petitioner 
________________________________ 
 
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from 
the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(Related to D.C. Civ. No. 14-cv-02218) 
_______________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Fed. R. App. Pro. 21 
June 5, 2014 
 
Before:  RENDELL, FISHER and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: July 16, 2014) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Petitioner John Sutcliffe, a South Carolina prisoner, seeks mandamus relief from 
this Court.  For the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition. 
 Sutcliffe asserts that his request for mandamus relief is related to a civil action 
filed in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, Thompson v. 
Morton, D.N.J. Civ. No. 14-cv-02218.  In that action, filed on April 3, 2014, fellow South 
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Carolina inmate Douglas Thompson sued several New Jersey state court judges, alleging 
a violation of his civil rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Sutcliffe also states in his mandamus 
petition that he and Thompson are parties in a consolidated action pending in the New 
Jersey Superior Court in Bergen County, Crawford v. McKie, No. BER-L-1708-14.  He 
asserts that several cases were filed in Hudson and Essex Counties by prisoners, and that 
these cases were improperly consolidated and transferred to Bergen County.  In 
connection with these cases, Sutcliffe claims a right to mandamus relief because 
“Thompson petitioned to remove” the Bergen County case to federal court “against our 
will.”  Petition, at 10.  Sutcliffe claims that, “by that action [Thompson] made me a party 
in [the federal court case] permitting me to correct any deficiency that was fraudulently 
done to us.”  Id. at 11.  Sutcliffe also demands that we provide him with all the relief that 
Thompson seeks in Thompson’s federal court case.  See id. at 13-14.  The remainder of 
Sutcliffe’s mandamus petition is devoted to a religious argument that the convictions of 
“All African Americans, Christians, Muslims and Jews [be] rendered void,” id. at 17, and 
it includes a demand that he and others be released from their South Carolina prisons, see 
id. at 34.  In connection with Sutcliffe’s request for mandamus relief, we have examined 
the complaint filed in Thompson v. Morton, D.N.J. Civ. No. 14-cv-02218, which was 
attached as an exhibit to the mandamus petition.   
 We will deny the petition for writ of mandamus.  Our jurisdiction derives from 28 
U.S.C. § 1651, which grants us the power to “issue all writs necessary or appropriate in 
aid of (our) . . . jurisdiction and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”  A writ of 
mandamus is an extreme remedy that is invoked only in extraordinary situations.  See 
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Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976).  Traditionally, it may be 
“used ... only ‘to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed 
jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so.’”  Id. 
(quoting  Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 n.2 (1967)).  To justify the use of this 
extraordinary remedy, a petitioner must show both a clear and indisputable right to the 
writ and that he has no other adequate means to obtain the relief desired.  See Haines v. 
Liggett Group Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 89 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 To the extent that Sutcliffe is challenging the handling of the New Jersey state 
case, Crawford v. McKie, No. BER-L-1708-14, by New Jersey state officials, he does not 
allege an action or omission by a United States District Court within this circuit over 
which we might exercise our authority by way of mandamus.  Cf. United States v. 
Christian, 660 F.2d 892, 895 (3d Cir. 1981) (focal question for federal appellate court is 
whether action of federal District Court impedes appellate jurisdiction granted in some 
other provision of law).  Accordingly, exercise of our mandamus jurisdiction would not 
be proper.  To the extent that Sutcliffe is seeking mandamus relief from his South 
Carolina conviction, he has other adequate means to obtain relief.  Haines, 975 F.2d at 89 
(mandamus petitioner must show, among other things, that he has no other adequate 
means to obtain the relief desired).  Sutcliffe may seek relief from his conviction in the 
appellate courts of South Carolina, or he may challenge his conviction and sentence 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the federal district court in South Carolina.   
 To the extent that Sutcliffe is challenging the actions or inactions of the federal 
District Judge assigned in the matter of Thompson v. Morton, D.N.J. Civ. No. 14-cv-
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02218, he lacks standing.  Sutcliffe is not a party in the Thompson federal civil rights 
action, and his allegations in the mandamus petition of injury-in-fact in connection with 
that action are vague.  We are not persuaded that he has standing to seek mandamus relief 
in connection with the Thompson case, see United States v. Mindel, 80 F.3d 394, 398 
(9th Cir. 1996) (except in First Amendment cases, party that does not have standing to 
directly appeal district court’s order does not have standing to petition court of appeals 
for writ of mandamus).  Moreover, as a non-lawyer pro se litigant, Sutcliffe may not 
represent parties in the federal courts other than himself.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1654; see also 
Osei-Afriyie v. Medical College of Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 882–83 (3d Cir. 1991).  If Sutcliffe 
seeks the same relief that Thompson has demanded in D.N.J. Civ. No. 14-cv-02218, he 
may file his own civil rights action in federal court, see 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (“The 
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be 
commenced by any person: *** (3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State 
law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity 
secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for 
equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.”).  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for writ of mandamus.  
Sutcliffe’s motion seeking to recall all remittiturs is denied.  His motion to “reinstate case 
14-1364” and to consolidate 14-1364, 14-2000, and 14-2811; motion titled “Affidavit of 
Facts Recalling the Remittitur in Case 2012-212427; and motion seeking Ex Parte 
Hearing and Legal Counsel, all are denied.  His various motions to supplement the 
mandamus petition are granted. 
